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A B S T R A C T 
 
If our central representation of an object is defined through embodied experience, we might expect access to  action 
affordances to be privileged over more abstract concepts. We used event-related potentials to examine the relative time 
course of access to affordances. Written object  names were primed with the name of an object  sharing the same 
affordance as the target (e.g. precision-grip: “grape” primed by “tweezers”) or the same taxonomic category (e.g. fruit: 
“grape”  primed by “apple”). N200 latencies, related to go/nogo semantic cate-   gory decisions on target words, 
revealed no difference in facilitation provided by affordance and semantic  priming. However, separate analyses of 
ERPs for go and nogo trials showed that semantic priming led to earlier activation during go trials (around 430 ms), and 
affordance priming led to earlier activation during nogo trials (around 180 ms). While affordances appear to be 
peripheral to the conceptual representation of objects, they do lead  to  direct  motor preparation. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The majority of the embodied cognition literature has focused on 
the sensorimotor processes involved in processing action words and 
sentences. However, it is also thought that the name of an object will 
also recruit the sensorimotor brain activity associated with the re- 
ferent’s form and function, such as its action affordances (Bub & 
Masson, 2012). Affordances are the behavioural possibilities provided 
by the environment and are detected automatically by the visual 
system, regardless of the organism’s intention to act (Garbarini & 
Adenzato, 2004; Gibson, 1979). For example a mug affords being 
grasped with the hand (Withagen, de Poel, Araújo, & Pepping, 2012). 
The Indexical Hypothesis proposes that nouns are indexed to mental 
representations (such as mental pictures) of the objects they refer to 
(Glenberg & Robertson, 1999). Subsequently, when a noun is processed 
the affordances of the referent object are made available. According to 
the Indexical Hypothesis accessing the affordances of referent objects is 
crucial for noun comprehension (Glenberg & Gallese, 2012; Glenberg & 
Robertson, 1999). A number of behavioural studies support the idea 
that affordances are retrieved during object name processing (Barbieri, 
Buonocore, Bernardis, Dalla Volta, & Gentilucci, 2007; Bub & Masson, 
2012; Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008; Gentilucci & Gangitano, 1998; Glover 
& Dixon, 2002; Glover, Rosenbaum, Graham, & Dixon, 2004; Marino, 
Gough, Gallese, Riggio, & Buccino, 2013; Myung, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 
2006;   Tucker   &   Ellis,   2004).   Participants   are   quicker   to   make 
 
categorical judgements when responding with a hand-grip that would 
be used to interact with the referent object (Tucker & Ellis, 2004; ex- 
periment 3). Furthermore, reading the name of a manipulable object 
activates areas of the premotor cortex which are also involved in action 
word processing (Grabowski, Damasio, & Damasio, 1998). 
While the interaction between motor and language processing is 
well evidenced, the utility of this relationship is an area of considerable 
controversy. There seems to be little doubt that linguistic representa- 
tions of actions and affordances can generate motor activity, but it is 
unclear what, if any, role this activity plays in language comprehension 
(Chatterjee, 2010; Dove, 2009, 2011; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008).  
Mahon and Caramazza (2008) argue that findings purported to support 
embodied cognition could just as easily be explained by a disembodied 
account. They propose that an initial retrieval of abstract concepts is 
followed by the spreading of activation to sensory and motor areas, 
with these activations reflecting a later epiphenomenal process, such as 
mental imagery. Language and situated simulation (LASS) theory pro- 
poses that two systems are involved in language comprehension 
(Barsalou, Santos, Simmons & Wilson, 2008). The Linguistic system 
identifies the word form and the simulation system activates perceptual 
and experiential information associated with the object, such as its af- 
fordances. The linguistic system is sufficient for resolving tasks that 
only require shallow processing, involving statistical relations between 
words in a semantic network (words associated through frequent co- 
occurrence).  For  deep  and  meaningful  processing,  simulations  are 
necessary and these are activated automatically, within 200 ms after 
word onset. It is important to understand when, and by implication 
what stage of processing, language perception makes use of embodied 
representations. If they are fundamental to the conceptual representa- 
tions of objects it might be expected that they would be available in 
advance of more abstract information. This kind of temporal informa- 
tion can be difficult to ascertain with behavioural experiments, but is 
particularly well suited to the ERP technique. Amsel, Urbach and Kutas 
(2013) used this technique to determine the temporal order of access to 
abstract and motor related semantic information when presented with 
the names of objects. Using a go/nogo task they compared the temporal 
onset of the N200 component when participants were asked to make a 
judgment on whether objects were graspable or non-graspable, or 
whether they were living or non-living. The N200 is a negative going 
component resulting from the subtraction of go from nogo trials, and is 
thought to provide an indication about when sufficient information has 
become available to allow a participant to make or withhold their re- 
sponse (Augustin, Defranceschi, Fuchs, Carbon, & Hutzler, 2011). 
Amsel et al. (2013) found that the onset of the N200 related to a living/ 
non-living judgment was at around 160 ms after stimulus presentation, 
compared to 300 ms for the graspable/non-graspable judgment. The 
relatively late access to grasp-related affordances prompted the authors 
to conclude that they did not play a crucial role in the conceptual re- 
presentation  of objects. 
Although the results provided by Amsel et al. (2013) seem relatively 
clear, they are based upon the assumption that the participant has di- 
rect access to the information relevant to this explicit decision. How- 
ever, affordances are generally considered to be processed auto- 
matically as a component of object representation that provides implicit 
facilitation of a wide range of responses (Barbieri et al., 2007; Glover   
et al., 2004; Marino et al., 2013; Myung et al., 2006; Pulvermüller, 
Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi, 2005; Tucker & Ellis, 2004). For example, Glover 
et al. (2004) found that when participants went to grasp a wooden 
block, the aperture of their grip was larger when they read a word re- 
ferring to a large object than a small object. Another study found that 
when participants heard the names of objects they spent longer looking 
toward pictures of objects that shared similar manipulation features 
with the named object than those that did not, with affordance-related 
looking occurring as early as 300 ms (Myung et al., 2006; experiment 
2). As it has been established that affordance modulates behaviour 
without the awareness of the participant, it is possible that the earliest 
access to this property may not be revealed through explicit ques- 
tioning. 
In our study we wanted to capture the implicit effects of affordance 
in an ERP study similar to that of Amsel et al. (2013). However, instead 
of comparing the N200 related to different explicit judgment decisions, 
i.e. those based on semantic and affordance information, we examined 
how the N200 related to the same semantic decision would be modu- 
lated by priming. Semantic priming effects are well established in the 
literature (Lucas, 2000), with priming found to improve both the ac- 
curacy and reaction times in lexical decision tasks (Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt, 1971). This facilitation is also found when the prime is 
masked (e.g. Forster & Davis, 1984), that is when presented for a very 
short duration (50–60 ms), usually sandwiched between two visually 
obscuring forward and backward masks. This is designed to allow the 
investigation of the prime-target relationship without the awareness of 
the participant, so preventing the use of explicit response strategies. 
Studies using the ERP technique have shown that semantically related 
prime-target pairs elicit a smaller N400 than semantically unrelated 
prime-target pairs (Deacon, Hewitt, Yang, & Nagata, 2000; Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2011). This is thought to reflect the greater ease in which 
the target is integrated into the semantic context provided by the prime 
(Borovsky, Elman, & Kutas, 2012). In most studies, the semantic re- 
latedness between prime and target is determined by semantic category 
norms, such as those of Battig and Montague (1969), which largely 
shared a taxonomic relationship (e.g. steel and iron being “types of 
metal”). There are few studies that have examined the relationship 
between objects formed by a shared affordance. In one such study by 
Myung et al. (2006), auditory prime and target words either shared 
similar manipulation features (e.g. piano and typewriter) or not (e.g. 
piano and blanket). This study showed that shared affordances fa- 
cilitated reaction times, but did not provide any direct comparison with 
the facilitation provided by taxonomic semantic priming. 
Here we have used the masked priming paradigm to compare the 
relative differences in priming between written prime-target word pairs 
that are related either through taxonomy (e.g. “grape” and “banana” are 
both fruit) or affordance (e.g. “hammer” and carrot” are both ma- 
nipulated using a power-grip). Both of these related priming conditions 
were also compared to a baseline condition, where the prime did not 
share the same taxonomy or affordance with the target (e.g. "mush- 
room" and "drill"). These word pairs were used in a go/nogo task to 
evoke an N200 component related to a speeded natural/manmade de- 
cision on the target words. An estimate of the temporal onset of affor- 
dance and general semantic information was provided through a 
comparison of the N200 between the three priming conditions. If the 
sensorimotor activity associated with affordances is fundamental to 
object representation, then we would hypothesise that the facilitation 
provided by the priming of affordances should occur earlier than that of 
semantic priming. Conversely, if affordances are produced as part of a 
post-lexical mental simulation of object use or accessed via an amodal 
process of spreading activation we would expect that the temporal onset 
of this information should occur after semantic processing. 
 
2. Method 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
Sixty native monolingual English speakers gave informed, written 
consent to participate in the experiment and were paid £12 for their 
participation. The Data from 9 participants was discarded due to ex- 
cessive EEG and electrooculography (EOG; eye movements) artefacts 
(less than 66% of recorded trials available for analysis). The remaining 
51 participants (32 female) were aged between 18 and 32 (mean age = 
21.76). All participants were right-handed (as assessed with the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory; Oldfield, 1971), reported having 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and had no history of neurolo- 
gical impairment. 
 
2.2. Stimuli 
 
The critical stimuli consisted of 32 different concrete nouns (taken 
from the CELEX database; Baayan, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995) re- 
ferring to manually manipulable objects. Sixteen of the nouns were used 
as prime words (3–10 letters in length) and 16 were used as the target 
words (3–6 letters in length). Half of the prime words referred to natural 
objects and half referred to manmade objects. Within each of those 
categories, half were the names of objects affording a power-grip (e.g. 
“hammer” or “carrot”) and half were names of objects affording a 
precision-grip (“scalpel” or “grape”). The target words were a different 
set of 16 nouns that were also equally divided between these four ca- 
tegories (manmade power-grip; manmade precision-grip; natural power- 
grip; natural precision-grip). 
Each prime word was paired with each target word so that there 
were 256 prime-target pairs. There were three conditions: semantic 
(when the prime and target referred to objects that were taxonomically 
related but did not afford the same grip e.g. ‘strawberry-banana’ or 
‘potato-pea’); affordance (when the prime and target referred to objects 
that afforded the same hand grip but were not taxonomically related 
e.g. ‘tweezers-lentil’ or ‘orange-axe’); or neutral (when the prime and 
target referred to objects that were neither semantically related nor 
afforded the same grip e.g. ‘fig-hammer’ or ‘scalpel-apple’; see Appendix 
for a full list of the stimuli). There were 64 different prime- 
 
Fig. 1. Example of stimuli presented in the experiment (a) and an illustration of the experimental sequence  (b). 
 
target pairs in each condition. The remaining prime-target pairs were 
used as filler stimuli. 
 
2.3. Procedure 
 
Participants were presented the stimuli on a CRT monitor (30.5 cm 
height by 40.5 cm width; 100 Hz refresh rate) positioned at eye level 
one metre from the participant in a quiet dimly-lit booth. Stimuli were 
presented using E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider & Zuccoloto, 2007), with re- 
sponses collected using an E-Prime button box. 
The sequence of each trial was as follows. At the beginning of each 
trial, a fixation point, “+”, appeared at the centre of the screen for 
600–800 ms. The fixation point was followed by a forward mask 
(##########) for 100 ms. This was followed by a prime word 
presented for 40 ms and then a backward mask (##########) for 
40 ms. The target was then presented for up to 2000 ms or until the 
participant responded. At the end of each trial a blink symbol, “(–) (–)”, 
was displayed for 1500 ms, giving the participant the opportunity to 
blink if necessary (see Fig. 1 for example stimuli and an illustration of 
the experimental sequence). The participants were asked to avoid 
making eye movements or blinks until the blink symbol was displayed 
in order to reduce contamination of the EEG data. All text was dis- 
played in the Courier New typeface in black on a white background. 
Participants responded to the target words using the index finger of 
their left hand. This was to make the response as unrelated to the object 
affordance as possible because the participants were all right-handed 
and would therefore usually pick up the objects with their right hand. A 
go/nogo paradigm in two between-participants response conditions 
was adopted whereby half of the participants were required to respond 
only to natural stimuli and to withhold responses to manmade stimuli. 
The other half were required only to respond to manmade stimuli and 
to withhold a response when they saw natural stimuli. Participants 
were instructed to indicate as quickly and accurately as possible whe- 
ther the word referred to the semantic category to which they had been 
assigned (i.e. natural or manmade). 
A sequence of 18 practice trials (using separate stimuli that were not 
used in the main experiment) was completed by each participant and 
could be repeated if necessary. After this each of the 256 prime-target 
word pairs were presented three times in three seamless blocks, re- 
sulting in 576 critical trials and 192 filler trials. Trials with slow (>  
1200 ms) or incorrect responses were excluded from further analysis 
(1% of trials). Trials were presented continuously with participants 
being provided with a ‘rest period’ after every 90 trials. 
 
2.4. EEG recording 
 
BrainVision Recorder (Version 1.10, Brain Products GmbH) was used 
to collect the scalp voltages from 61 Ag/AgCl active electrodes (actiCAP, 
Brain Products, Gilching, Germany). The sensors were ar-ranged in the 
International 10–20 configuration and secured in place on the 
participant’s scalp by an elastic cap. An additional two sensors were 
positioned below and adjacent to the participant’s right eye to monitor 
eye movements. Segments of EEG data containing eye movement or 
blink artefacts were not included in later analyses. All scalp electrode 
impedance measurements were kept below 20 kΩ. The EEG signals were 
amplified by a BrainAmp MR Plus amplifier (Brain Products). 
 
2.5. EEG analyses 
 
Vision Analyser (Version 2.0, Brain Products GmbH) was used to 
process the data. EEG was sampled at a rate of 250 Hz and filtered 
offline with a band-pass filter of 0.1–40 Hz (with a roll-off slope of 12 
dB/oct) and subjected to a 50 Hz notch filter. The EEG recordings were 
segmented into 1000 ms epochs, spanning from 200 ms before the onset 
of the target word until 800 ms afterwards. Separate ERPs were 
generated for the same set of target word stimuli presented in three 
different priming conditions (semantic, affordance and neutral priming). 
Baseline correction was performed using the average EEG activity 
between −200 ms and 0 ms. The electrodes were referenced to the left 
mastoid electrode and then re-referenced offline to the average of the 
left and right mastoid data. The central anterior-frontal electrode (AFz) 
was used as the ground. Segments containing artefacts were re-jected 
from analyses and participants with less than two thirds of their 
segments intact after artefact removal were excluded from the analyses. 
Inaccurate responses were discarded, as were trials with reaction times 
2.5 standard deviations above or below the mean, or outside the 200– 
1200 ms time window. 
To calculate the N200, the go data was subtracted from the nogo 
data for each condition (Amsel et al., 2013; Schmitt, Münte, & Kutas, 
2000). Comparisons between conditions were conducted across all 
electrodes and post zero-point sample points using pairwise analyses 
based upon the cluster randomisation technique of Maris and 
Oostenveld (2007), to avoid multiple comparisons. In this technique, 
two-sided t-tests were carried out comparing each electrode-time sample 
pair between two of the tested conditions (e.g. affordance and semantic 
priming). Those samples with a t-value above significance threshold  (p 
< .05) were clustered together in terms of temporal and spatial 
adjacency. Only clusters of eight or more samples were con-sidered for 
analysis. For each of the remaining clusters a summed t-value was 
calculated as a total of all individual t-values from all of the individual 
comparisons. Analysis thereafter was based on these clusters rather than 
the individual data points. In the second step of this pro-cedure the 
 
 
performed 1000 times to generate a Monte Carlo distribution of 
summed t-values corresponding to the null hypothesis. The final Monte 
Carlo p-value was calculated as the proportion of the 1000 summed t- 
values in the random distribution that exceeded the observed cluster- 
level  t statistic. 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Behavioural results 
 
Accuracy data. The average proportion of correct responses across  
all conditions was found to be 99.44%. An ANOVA was conducted 
comparing accuracy between the 3 conditions (semantic, affordance, 
neutral), 2 response types (go, nogo) and 2 categories (manmade, 
natural). There were no significant effects, ps > .1. 
Reaction Times. An ANOVA was conducted comparing the 3 con- 
ditions (semantic, affordance, neutral) and 2 categories (manmade, 
natural).  A  significant  main  effect  of  condition  was  found,  F(3, 
147) = 9.89, p < .0001, with participants responding significantly 
quicker on the semantic primed trials (M = 572.38 ms, SD = 90.78) 
compared to the affordance trials (M = 587.97 ms, SD = 90.78; F(1 
,49) = 11.39, p < .01), and  the  neutral  trials  (M = 587.88 ms,  
SD = 90.84; F(1, 49) = 10.94, p < .01). Reaction times for the affor- 
dance and neutral trials did not differ significantly from each other, F(1, 
49) = .031, p > .5. A significant effect of category was also found F(1, 
49) = 4.22,  p  < .05,  with  responses  to   natural   object   targets  
(M = 552.76 ms, SD = 95.63) being significantly faster than responses 
to manmade object targets (M = 601.76 ms, SD = 77.08). There was no 
significant interaction between condition and target category, F(3, 
147) = 1.50,  p  > .1. 
 
3.2. Electrophysiological results 
 
N200 analyses: comparison to baseline. The N200 was calculated  
by subtracting ERPs for go trials from those of nogo trials for the three 
priming conditions. For each condition, independent t-tests were used 
to compare the voltage of the N200 to a baseline of 0 across all tem- 
poral samples and active electrodes. These multiple comparisons were 
then corrected using the previously described cluster randomisation 
procedure. Significant clusters are listed in Table 1 and scalp maps il- 
lustrating the location of activity are shown in Fig. 2. This indicates that 
the information contingent on the semantic decision task (natural vs. 
manmade categorisation) was available from 208 ms after target word 
onset when primed with a semantically related word, from 252 ms 
when primed with a word sharing a similar micro-affordance and from 
280 ms when it was primed with a neutral  word. 
N200  analyses:  comparison  between  conditions.  Independent  t-  
tests were also carried out to examine the difference between the N200s 
of the different conditions. Again, multiple comparisons were corrected 
using the cluster randomisation procedure. The resulting significant 
clusters are shown in Table 2 and displayed in Fig. 3. 
When subtracting the neutral from the semantic priming condition 
the presence of an early negative cluster (cS-N1) shows that the onset of 
the N200 was significantly earlier for semantically primed compared to 
neutrally primed target words. The later positive cluster (cS-N2) also 
 
Table 1 
Summary of significant clusters for the N200 of the semantic, affordance, and 
neutral  conditions  compared  to baseline. 
 
interval occupied by the cluster with the largest cluster-level t-value was 
selected. Each of the original paired sample t-tests that were used to 
generate this cluster were repeated, but with the data items of each pair 
Condition No. of 
clusters 
Name of 
cluster 
Polarity Duration P-value 
randomly assigned between the two conditions. This was 
Semantic 1 cS Negative      208–800 ms      p  < .001 
Affordance     1 cA Negative      252–800 ms      p  < .001 
Neutral 1 cN Negative       280–800 ms       p < .001 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Scalp maps showing t-scores for significant clusters revealed by the cluster randomisation comparison  between the  N200 and baseline for semantic,  affor-  
dance, and neutral priming conditions. 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary of significant clusters in the comparisons between the N200 of the semantic, affordance, and neutral conditions. 
Conditions compared No. of clusters Name of cluster Polarity Duration P-value 
Semantic  – Neutral 
 
Affordance – Neutral 
2 
 
1 
cS-N1 
cS-N2 
cA-N 
Negative 
Positive 
Negative 
176–300 ms 
368–500 ms 
200–292 ms 
p = .002 
p < .001 
p < .001 
Semantic  – Affordance 1 cS-A Positive 320–500 ms p < .001 
 
Fig. 3. Scalp maps showing t-scores for the significant clusters revealed by the cluster randomisation comparing semantic, affordance, and neutral priming N200s. 
 
indicates that the offset of the N200 is earlier in the semantic than the 
neutral priming condition. Similar comparisons also revealed that the 
N200 was earlier in the affordance priming condition than the neutral 
priming condition (cluster cA-N). However, there was no significant 
difference between the latency of the onset of the N200 between the 
semantic priming condition and the affordance priming condition, only 
that the offset of the N200 was earlier in the former condition (cluster 
cS-A). 
Summary of N200 results. Given that the onset of the N200 is  
thought to reveal the earliest time a participant has access to in- 
formation required to make their task-related judgement, it is normal to 
find that onset latencies for this component are highly correlated to 
behavioural reaction times. This was indeed the case when comparing 
our semantic and neutral priming conditions, with the reaction times 
and N200 onset both being earlier in the semantic than the neutral 
priming condition. However, while reaction times were found to be 
significantly faster in the semantic priming condition than the affor- 
dance priming condition, we found no significant difference in the onset 
of the N200 between these conditions. A logical explanation for this 
disparity lies in the fact that reaction times are only garnered during go 
trials, while the N200 is the result of a subtraction of ERP between go 
and nogo trials. Thus, it is possible that the relatively early onset of the 
N200 for affordance priming is a result of greater activity during nogo 
trials, which would not be reflected in reaction times. Therefore, to test 
Table 3 
Summary of significant clusters in the comparisons between the go trial ERPs of the semantic, affordance, and neutral conditions. 
Condition No. of clusters Name of cluster Polarity Duration P-value 
Semantic  – Neutral 1 cS-N-Go Negative 428–708 ms p  < .001 
Affordance – Neutral 1 cA-N-Go Negative 520–728 ms p = .001 
Semantic  – Affordance 1 cS-A-Go Negative 440–556 ms p < .001 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Scalp maps showing t-scores for significant clusters revealed by the cluster randomisation comparison between semantic, affordance, and neutral priming 
conditions  in  go trials. 
Table 4 
Summary of significant clusters in the comparisons between the nogo trial ERPs of the semantic, affordance, and neutral conditions. 
Condition No. of clusters Name of cluster Polarity Duration p-value 
Semantic  – Neutral 1 cS-N-Nogo Negative 500–632 ms p = .001 
Affordance – Neutral 1 cA-N-Nogo Negative 176–352 ms p = .001 
Semantic  – Affordance 2 cS-A1-Nogo 
cS-A2-Nogo 
Positive 
Negative 
296–472 ms 
492–628 ms 
p = .002 
p < .001 
 
this hypothesis we conducted separate analyses of ERP for go and nogo 
trials. 
Analyses of go trials. Paired sample t-tests were used to compare   
the ERPs of the semantic and neutral priming conditions for go trials 
only. As before, individual t-tests were conducted for each sample re- 
corded over each of the electrodes and multiple comparisons then 
corrected using the cluster randomisation procedure. The significant 
clusters are displayed in Table 3 and Fig. 4. Both semantic and affor- 
dance related priming evoked earlier activity in go-trial targets when 
compared with the neutral priming condition. However, activity for 
semantic primed targets occurred ∼100 ms earlier than those primed 
with affordance, as indicated by the presence of the negative polarity 
cluster (cS-A-Go). 
Analyses of nogo trials. The significant clusters resulting from the 
cluster randomisation procedure for nogo trials are displayed in Table 4 
and Fig. 5. As in the go trials, both semantic and affordance priming of 
targets in nogo trials resulted in significantly earlier activity than in the 
neutral priming condition. However, in this case, a direct comparison of 
semantic and affordance priming showed that the onset of activity was 
significantly earlier in the affordance priming condition, as revealed by 
the positive polarity cluster (cS-A1-Nogo). The later cluster (cS-A2- 
Nogo) did reveal greater negative amplitudes due to semantic priming, 
but later, from 492 to 628 ms. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
In this study, we examined the relative time course of access to an 
object’s semantic or action-affordance features when reading its name. 
The availability of these different types of information was ascertained 
through an examination of the N200 ERP component, which can be 
used to determine when specific task-related information becomes 
available to a participant in a go/nogo paradigm. In our study parti- 
cipants made a semantic decision related to a written object name, 
categorising the described object as either manmade or natural. These 
target object names were primed by written words that were related to 
the target through a shared affordance, semantic taxonomy or were 
unrelated to the target in a neutral priming condition. 
Our results showed that the onset of the N200 was earlier when the 
target words were primed with either semantic or affordance related 
primes, at around 210–250 ms post target onset, than when they were 
preceded with an unrelated word, where the onset was at 280 ms. 
Importantly, there was no significant difference in N200 onset latency 
between affordance and semantic related primes. This would normally 
indicate that the two types of related priming conditions offer equiva- 
lent facilitation of the semantic decision made on the target words. 
However, this was found to be at odds with the behavioural reaction 
time data. Only semantic priming facilitated decision latencies, with 
latencies during the priming of affordances not differing significantly 
from the neutral priming condition. The explanation we pursued to 
explain for this disparity relates to the methodology used to calculate 
the N200 component, which is a difference wave of stimuli presented in 
go and nogo trials. This analysis draws upon all of the trials tested in the 
experiment, while reaction times are only provided for go trials. The 
disparity between reaction times and N200 latencies suggests that there 
is an asymmetric difference in ERPs between go and nogo trials that is 
modulated by the priming condition. From an embodied perspective 
this would not be unexpected, as it is possible that the motor pre- 
paration afforded by the objects described in the prime words could 
interact with a later task-related manual response. To investigate this 
explanation, we conducted separate ERP analyses for go and nogo 
trials. In go trials we found that the onset of activity in the semantic 
priming condition was significantly earlier than the other two priming 
conditions, starting around 430 ms after target onset. While the onset of 
activity in the affordance priming condition was earlier than that of the 
neutral condition, this difference was relatively late, at around 520 ms. 
This could explain why affordance priming had no significant effect on 
reaction times, as the associated activity was proximal to the beha- 
vioural response times of around 560–580 ms and therefore too late to 
influence those responses. Thus, it would appear that the temporal as- 
pect of go-response ERPs is in line with the behavioural latency dif- 
ferences. Conversely, in the ERPs from nogo trials the effect of affor- 
dance priming started at 180 ms, significantly earlier than semantic 
priming at around 500 ms. This comparison of go and nogo trials shows 
how the parity in the N200 onset in semantic and affordance priming 
conditions mask quite different underlying activities, with early acti- 
vation of semantic representations in go trials, and early affordance 
related activity in nogo  trials. 
In part, these findings follow established semantic priming results, 
with activation from the prime word facilitating the activation of the 
proceeding semantically related targets. This is clearly evident in the 
semantic priming condition, where we find facilitation of behavioural 
semantic decision latencies, and early activity in the go trial ERPs. We 
also found activity related to affordance priming in go trials, but in a 
much later temporal window. Normally, these particular results would 
be indicative of a post-lexical mental simulation account of affordance 
(Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) but they are at odds with other studies 
that have found an affordance-related facilitation in lexical decision 
latency (Myung et al., 2006; Rueschemeyer, Lindemann, van Rooij, van 
Dam, & Bekkering,  2010). 
One potential reason why we did not find a behavioural effect of 
affordance priming previously seen in lexical decisions is due to the task 
used in our study. This is not related particularly to the semantic de- 
cision task per se, but rather the relationship between the task and the 
two priming conditions. In the semantic priming condition, the taxo- 
nomic relation between prime and target ensured that they would share 
the semantic feature directly probed by the task i.e. prime and target 
would either both be natural or both be manmade. In contrast, the 
primes and targets in the affordance condition were selected such that 
their only shared feature should be the grip used to manipulate them. 
As such, natural primes would always be paired with artificial targets 
and vice versa. Thus, prime-target pairs in the affordance condition are 
always unrelated with respect to the attended semantic feature directed 
by the behavioural task (i.e. natural vs manmade). This means that the 
semantic priming condition has a direct relationship between prime, 
target, and task, whereas in the affordance condition the relationship 
between prime and target was orthogonal to the task. Therefore, it is 
possible that reaction times in affordance and semantic priming con- 
ditions may have been modulated by differences in the relationship 
between prime and task, rather than the relationship between prime 
and target. It must be noted, that this distinction cannot be applied to 
the temporal disparities shown in the study by Amsel et al. (2013), as 
they  compared  the  temporal  onset  of  distinct  and  explicit semantic 
 
 
Fig. 5. Scalp maps showing t-scores for the significant clusters revealed by the cluster randomisation comparison between semantic, affordance, and neutral priming 
conditions  in  nogo trials. 
 
decisions, rather than comparisons of priming in the same decision. 
In Amsel et al. (2013) the onset of the N200 ERP component re- 
vealed that participants were able to differentiate between living and 
non-living entities from as early as 160 ms, whereas the graspability of 
the object was retrieved around 300 ms. It is concluded that this rela- 
tively late access to grasp-related affordances indicates that they do not 
play a crucial role in the conceptual representation of objects. In our 
own study, N200 latencies when priming affordance and semantic 
features of target words were equivalent, from around 210 ms. Al- 
though similar, there are some important methodological divergences 
between our two studies that could explain the differences between our 
N200 latencies. Firstly, the affordances related to Amsel et al.’s stimuli 
appeared to be based on the object’s geometry, rather than stored re- 
presentation of use. For example, a “mouse” (the small rodent not the 
hand-held device) is categorised as graspable, but a “motorbike” is not. 
In terms of affordances, the experience one has with using or manip- 
ulating an object is an important aspect of the sensorimotor activity 
elicited (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; 
Rueschemeyer et al., 2010; Siakaluk et al., 2008). Therefore, one could 
categorise a motorbike as a “graspable” object, as it is manipulated 
primarily through its handlebars. Conversely, a mouse is unlikely to 
have  a  stored  affordance,  generated  through  past  interactions,   but 
would rely upon an intrinsic geometric affordance inferred from its size. 
Physical size provides a salient affordance in visual stimuli, with direct 
vision-to-action activation obviating the requirement for higher level 
knowledge (Rumiati & Humphreys, 1998). However, in a linguistic 
modality, geometric affordances have to be mediated through stereo- 
typing of object properties. Therefore, in Amsel et al. the temporal onset 
of affordance seen in the N200 would have included any delay required 
to infer a geometric affordance. In contrast, our study used a combi- 
nation of stored and geometric affordance for each prime/target pair. 
This could be particularly important given that Amsel et al. based their 
temporal estimates upon a manipulation of the question posed in an 
explicit decision task, i.e. between making a living/non-living or 
graspable/non-graspable  judgment. 
One of our central questions is whether the availability of implied 
geometric information to an explicit decision task, as tested in Amsel et 
al., can provide an ecologically valid estimate of the temporal onset of 
affordance. We suggest that this is challenged by our finding of early 
activity associated with affordance priming in nogo trials, a con-sequence 
of the manual motor preparation generated by the shared affordances 
between prime and target. In nogo trials this motor pre-paration is 
incompatible with the requirement of the participant to withhold a 
manual response, and the inhibition of the response be-comes evident in 
the ERP. The spatial distribution of this activity, evident in right pre- 
frontal electrodes, is similar to the activity found in previous research in 
the right inferior frontal gyrus during the inhibi-tion of motor responses 
(Chikazoe, Konishi, Asari, Jimura, & Miyashita, 2007; Hampshire, 
Chamberlain, Monti, Duncan, & Owen, 2010). Lesion studies also 
illustrate the involvement of the frontal lobe in inhibiting affordances 
that are automatically elicited by visual objects. One study found that 
some patients with frontal lobe lesions would grasp and use any objects 
in their field of vision without any real purpose for doing so (Lhermitte, 
1983; Riddoch, Edwards, Humphreys, West, & Heafield, 1998). Lhermitte 
(1983) argued that this ‘utilization behaviour’, as he termed it, resulted 
from the inability of the frontal lobe to perform the usual inhibitory 
function on the parietal lobe’s motor programs. Re-search shows how the 
parietal lobe is involved in the integration of visual and somatosensory 
information and converting this into motor commands (see Fogassi & 
Luppino, 2005, for a review). The temporal period of this affordance 
related activity, spanning P2 and N2 compo-nents, is also consistent with 
previous accounts of these components reflecting stimulus evaluation 
and response selection (Gajewski, Stoerig, & Falkenstein, 2008; Potts, 
2004). Gajewski et al. (2008) ar-gued that this might be more effortful 
when an incorrect response is activated by misleading cues. We posit that 
there is a similar modula-tion of the P2/N2 complex in our study due to 
the effort required to inhibit a response once the motor system had been 
primed to respond. We suggest that this is the source of the early activity 
observed in our affordance primed nogo trials. 
A particularly noteworthy aspect of this account of our affordance 
effects is that the task-related manual response was not directly related to 
the affordance of the object. While participants were asked to re-spond or 
withhold a manual response, the left index finger button press required 
was not directly related to the grip afforded by either the prime or target 
referent object. Similarly, generalised effects have been found in previous 
research (Postle, Ashton, McFarland, & De Zubicaray, 2013; 
Rueschemeyer et al., 2010; Siakaluk et al., 2008). Rueschemeyer et al. 
found that lexical decisions were quicker and more accurate for names of 
manipulable objects when participants simultaneously exe-cuted a motor 
action. In this case the action, requiring participants to run their finger 
along the edge of a desk, was not specific to the af-forded actions of the 
objects. Postle et al. also found that it didn’t matter which body part was 
being described by their linguistic stimuli, the 
 
 
right hand was affected indifferently. This shows that the motor pre- 
paration generated through affordance priming does not necessarily 
have to be related to a specific motor program, such as a particular grip, 
but can be broadly tuned to include other manual activity. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The main aim of this study was to investigate the deeply embodied 
claim that sensorimotor information related to the form or function of 
an object, is fundamental to its conceptual representation and plays a 
privileged role in the comprehension of their linguistic descriptors 
(Glenberg & Gallese, 2012; Glenberg & Robertson, 1999). Conversely, it 
has been suggested that access to action-affordances is not privileged 
above other semantic features that make up an object’s conceptual re- 
presentation, and that their activation is a result of post-lexical mental 
simulation of referent object use (e.g. Amsel et al., 2013; Mahon & 
Caramazza, 2008). In support of the former theory, we established that 
the priming of affordance evokes the rapid activation of motor re- 
presentation during the reading of object names. This is indicative of 
somatotopic activity in the motor system associated with the affordance 
of the named object, similar to that shown across a range of studies 
during the reading of action words (Hauk, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 
2008; Pulvermüller, Härle, & Hummel, 2001; Pulvermüller, 
Lutzenberger, & Preissl, 1999; Shtyrov, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2004). 
However, while listeners do seem able to extract embodied information 
from linguistic representations, this information does not appear to play 
a fundamental role in the semantic integration processes related to our 
task. The early activity related to affordance priming, seen from around 
180 ms, was strictly limited to nogo trials. This indicates that this ac- 
tivity is related to the inhibition of the afforded motor preparation, as 
participants seek to withhold the manual response related to the task. 
While taxonomically related primes facilitated semantic decisions, af- 
fordance related primes did not. In go trials the onset of activity related 
to affordance priming was relatively late, starting at around 520 ms, 
compared to an onset of 430 ms for semantic priming. This set of 
findings is perhaps most consistent with theories that posit multiple 
processing routes in comprehension, such as the language and situated 
simulation (LASS) theory (Barsalou et al., 2008). This would allow for a 
distinction between the early activation of the motor representation 
afforded by the described object and the route used to access abstract 
conceptual information during comprehension. Whereas semantic- 
priming can occur by recruiting the linguistic system’s method of ac- 
tivating associated words in a distributional semantic network, affor- 
dance-priming involves the situated simulation route. Our research 
suggests that the early motor simulation activity is activated auto- 
matically and in a similar time frame to categorical knowledge. Later 
affordance related activation could either be the result of another si- 
mulation cycle or integration of information across the two routes. 
 
Statement of significance 
 
From examining the event-related potentials of participants reading 
object names, we found early activation of object  affordances  from  
176 ms. This suggests affordances are activated during an earlier stage 
of linguistic processing than previously thought. In the article, we ex- 
plain why current research methodologies may have failed to find si- 
milar results. 
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Appendix. Stimuli 
 
Semantic Affordance Neutral 
Prime Target Prime Target Prime Target 
Marker Axe Potato Axe Strawberry Axe 
Eraser Axe Cucumber Axe Fig Axe 
Tweezers Axe Orange Axe Bean Axe 
Scalpel Axe Pear Axe Mushroom Axe 
Marker Hammer Potato Hammer Strawberry Hammer 
Eraser Hammer Cucumber Hammer Fig Hammer 
Tweezers Hammer Orange Hammer Bean Hammer 
Scalpel Hammer Pear Hammer Mushroom Hammer 
Marker Drill Potato Drill Strawberry Drill 
Eraser Drill Cucumber Drill Fig Drill 
Tweezers Drill Orange Drill Bean Drill 
Scalpel Drill Pear Drill Mushroom Drill 
Marker Saw Potato Saw Strawberry Saw 
Eraser Saw Cucumber Saw Fig Saw 
Tweezers Saw Orange Saw Bean Saw 
Scalpel Saw Pear Saw Mushroom Saw 
Spanner Pin Strawberry Pin Potato Pin 
Spade Pin Fig Pin Cucumber Pin 
Stapler Pin Bean Pin Orange Pin 
Trowel Pin Mushroom Pin Pear Pin 
Spanner Needle Strawberry Needle Potato Needle 
Spade Needle Fig Needle Cucumber Needle 
Stapler Needle Bean Needle Orange Needle 
Trowel Needle Mushroom Needle Pear Needle 
Spanner Biro Strawberry Biro Potato Biro 
Spade Biro Fig Biro Cucumber Biro 
Stapler Biro Bean Biro Orange Biro 
Trowel Biro Mushroom Biro Pear Biro 
Spanner Pencil Strawberry Pencil Potato Pencil 
Spade Pencil Fig Pencil Cucumber Pencil 
Stapler Pencil Bean Pencil Orange Pencil 
Trowel Pencil Mushroom Pencil Pear Pencil 
Strawberry Apple Spanner Apple Marker Apple 
Fig Apple Spade Apple Eraser Apple 
Bean Apple Stapler Apple Tweezers Apple 
Mushroom Apple Trowel Apple Scalpel Apple 
Strawberry Banana Spanner Banana Marker Banana 
Fig Banana Spade Banana Eraser Banana 
Bean Banana Stapler Banana Tweezers Banana 
Mushroom Banana Trowel Banana Scalpel Banana 
Strawberry Carrot Spanner Carrot Marker Carrot 
Fig Carrot Spade Carrot Eraser Carrot 
Bean Carrot Stapler Carrot Tweezers Carrot 
Mushroom Carrot Trowel Carrot Scalpel Carrot 
Strawberry Onion Spanner Onion Marker Onion 
Fig Onion Spade Onion Eraser Onion 
Bean Onion Stapler Onion Tweezers Onion 
Mushroom Onion Trowel Onion Scalpel Onion 
Potato Lentil Marker Lentil Spanner Lentil 
Cucumber Lentil Eraser Lentil Spade Lentil 
Orange Lentil Tweezers Lentil Stapler Lentil 
Pear Lentil Scalpel Lentil Trowel Lentil 
Potato Pea Marker Pea Spanner Pea 
Cucumber Pea Eraser Pea Spade Pea 
Orange Pea Tweezers Pea Stapler Pea 
Pear Pea Scalpel Pea Trowel Pea 
Potato Grape Marker Grape Spanner Grape 
Cucumber Grape Eraser Grape Spade Grape 
Orange Grape Tweezers Grape Stapler Grape 
I.M. Feven-Parsons, J. Goslin BrainandLanguage184(2018)20–31 
 
Pear Grape Scalpel Grape Trowel Grape 
Potato Cherry Marker Cherry Spanner Cherry 
Cucumber Cherry Eraser Cherry Spade Cherry 
Orange Cherry Tweezers Cherry Stapler Cherry 
Pear Cherry Scalpel Cherry Trowel Cherry 
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